vinindkoeb/.env.example
carsten 4eb8800872 Add Postal webhook receiver for delivery status (task 7c)
POST /webhooks/postal (unauthenticated — RSA signature is the auth)
verifies the X-Postal-Signature-256 header: RSA-SHA256/PKCS1v15 over
the raw request body, using the same keypair as DKIM signing. Verified
directly against Postal's own source (lib/postal/http.rb, signer.rb)
rather than guessed, after the user pointed out the mechanism and that
their instance is new enough to use the -256 (SHA256) header over the
legacy SHA1 one. The public key is stored as the raw base64 DER blob
from the domain's DKIM DNS TXT record (dig TXT
postal-eWHeqb._domainkey.vinindkoeb.dk) — no PEM wrapping needed,
cryptography.load_der_public_key takes it directly.

Events are correlated to MailLog via postal_message_id. MessageSent
(actual delivery confirmation, not to be confused with task 7b's
synchronous "Postal accepted the request") maps to the DELIVERED
status already reserved for it; MessageDeliveryFailed/MessageBounced/
MessageHeld/MessageDelayed map to new terminal/transient statuses.
MessageLoaded/MessageLinkClicked set separate opened_at/clicked_at
timestamps rather than overwriting status, since engagement can happen
after delivery and shouldn't regress it. DomainDNSError and any
unrecognized event are acknowledged (200) and ignored — no message to
correlate.

Discovered along the way: the native_enum=False enum columns are
plain length-capped VARCHARs with no IN-list CHECK constraint, so
adding "held"/"delayed" needed no constraint migration, just the two
new opened_at/clicked_at columns Alembic did autogenerate correctly.

Verified: signature logic in isolation against a self-generated RSA
keypair (valid data/signature accepted, tampered data and garbage
signatures rejected), the real DKIM key parses correctly (1024-bit
RSA), the live endpoint rejects missing/invalid signatures with 401,
and the event-to-MailLog mapping logic was exercised directly (not
over HTTP, since a validly Postal-signed payload can't be forged
without their private key) against an isolated throwaway sandbox —
all cleaned up afterward, real route/participant data confirmed
unaffected throughout.

True end-to-end verification (a real Postal-originated webhook call)
requires the app to be deployed somewhere Postal can reach, plus
configuring the webhook URL in Postal's admin UI — both are deployment
steps outside this coding task.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:50:24 +02:00

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DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://user:password@localhost:5432/vinindkoeb
ENVIRONMENT=development
SECRET_KEY=change-me # generér med: openssl rand -hex 32
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES=120
ELEVATION_EXPIRE_MINUTES=5
POSTAL_BASE_URL=https://postal.example.com
POSTAL_API_KEY=change-me
# Find med: dig +short TXT <dkim-selector>._domainkey.<dit-domæne>
# og brug værdien af "p=" (base64 DER, ingen PEM-indpakning nødvendig)
POSTAL_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY_B64=change-me